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Abstract Nation-states have been embracing online influence campaigns through
disinformation at breakneck speeds. Countries such as China and Russia have
completely revamped their military doctrine to information-first platforms [1, 2]
(Mattis, Peter. (2018). China’s Three Warfares in Perspective. War on the Rocks.
Special Series: Ministry of Truth. https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-threewarfares-perspective/, Cunningham, C. (2020). A Russian Federation Information
Warfare Primer. Then Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. Washington
University. https://jsis.washington.edu/news/a-russian-federation-information-war
fare-primer/.) to compete with the United States and the West. The Chinese principle
of “Three Warfares” and Russian Hybrid Warfare have been used and tested across
the spectrum of operations ranging from competition to active conflict. With the
COVID19 pandemic limiting most means of face-to-face interpersonal communication, many other nations have transitioned to online tools to influence audiences
both domestically and abroad [3] (Strick, B. (2020). COVID-19 Disinformation:
Attempted Influence in Disguise. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. International
Cyber Policy Center. https://www.aspi.org.au/report/covid-19-disinformation.) to
create favorable environments for their geopolitical goals and national objectives.
This chapter focuses on the landscape that allows nations like China and Russia to
attack democratic institutions and discourse within the United States, the strategies
and tactics employed in these campaigns, and the emergent technologies that will
enable these nations to gain an advantage with key populations within their spheres
of influence or to create a disadvantage to their competitors within their spheres
of influence. Advancements in machine learning through generative adversarial
networks [4] (Creswell, A; White, T; Dumoulin, V; Arulkumaran, K; Sengupta,
B; Bharath, A. (2017) Generative Adversarial Networks: An Overview. IEE-SPM.
April 2017. https://arxiv.org/pdf/1710.07035.pdf.) that create deepfakes [5] (Whittaker, L; Letheren, K; Mulcahy, R. (2021). The Rise of Deepfakes: A Conceptual
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Framework and Research Agenda for Marketing. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
abs/10.1177/1839334921999479.) and attention-based transformers [6] (https://
arxiv.org/abs/1810.04805.) (Devlin et al., 2018) that create realistic speech patterns
and interaction will continue to plague online discussion and information spread,
attempting to cause further partisan divisions and decline of U.S. stature on the
world stage and democracy as a whole.
Keywords Disinformation · Cyberspace · Cyber-enabled influence · Influence
operation

Executive Summary
Online influence campaigns have become a relatively cheap and impactful way for
nations to drive narratives both within their borders and internationally. Since the
discovery of Russia and the Internet Research Agency’s interference in the 2016
U.S. presidential election and the 2016 U.K. European Union Referendum, seventy
other nations have increased their funding for similar campaigns [7].1 Malign Influence Operations use inauthentic users to push narratives and manipulate social media
recommendation algorithms to target key demographics with troves of publicly available data, amplifying already reticent societal fissures and standing as a major danger
to democratic institutions throughout the world. Democracy requires four essential
functions, as described by Hoover Institute Fellow Larry Diamond. The first requirement is a political system for choosing and replacing the government through free
and fair elections. The second requirement is the active participation of people, as
citizens, in politics and civic life. The third is the protection of the human rights of all
citizens. Finally, the fourth requirement is the rule of law, in which laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens [8].2 Emergent technologies built from advances
in machine learning, such as deepfakes [5],3 will compound current challenges by
adding additional layers of believability to these inauthentic users [9]4 and their
malign influence campaigns, making it more difficult for audiences to discern fact
from fiction.
Russia and China have utilized these techniques heavily across the last two decades
and expanded on them greatly in the COVID era. Other smaller nations have flocked
1

Bradshaw, S; Bailey, H; Howard, P. (2020). 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social
Media Manipulation. Computational Propaganda Research Project. Oxford Internet Institute. Oxford University. https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/127/2021/02/Cyb
erTroop-Report20-Draft9.pdf.
2 https://diamond-democracy.stanford.edu/speaking/lectures/what-democracy.
3 Whittaker, L; Letheren, K; Mulcahy, R. (2021). The Rise of Deepfakes: A Conceptual Framework
and Research Agenda for Marketing. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/183933492199
9479.
4 Bastos, M., & Mercea, D. (2018). The public accountability of social platforms: lessons from a
study on bots and trolls in the Brexit campaign. Philosophical transactions. Series A, Mathematical,
physical, and engineering sciences, 376(2128), 20,180,003. https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2018.0003.
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to methods to bolster their spheres of influence as well as confound international audiences due to the low cost of entry as well as almost relatively nonexistent regulatory
barriers to participate at scale. Numerous prevalent examples exist during the last
year. Russian attempts at interfering with the 2020 U.S. Presidential election through
planting false stories and pushing various false narratives of a stolen election are well
known [10].5 China has used online influence campaigns to crush popular support for
democracy in Hong Kong [11],6 limiting knowledge and creating confusion around
allegations of ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Muslim Uyghurs population in Xinjiang province [12],7 and revitalize its global image in the wake of the
COVID19 pandemic [13].8 Azerbaijan has effectively used disinformation during
its ongoing military excursions into Armenia [14].9 Myanmar’s military coup and
consolidation of power removed democratically elected officials while killing ethnic
minorities in the north and west of the country [15].10
As confusion around these events continues, it undermines a basic understanding
of the situation and erodes the ability of governments to act collectively. Groups like
Bellingcat use collaborative efforts to teach tactics to investigate and rapidly disseminate their findings to a global audience. The thankless efforts of subject matter experts
and analysts will unfortunately not be enough to prevent the fomenting of dissidence
against democratic ideals. We need active development of machine learning algorithms to handle the flood of coordinated influence campaigns, education on the
effects these campaigns have on our population, and expertise and human input to
make any sort of headway. Coordination efforts would require a central agency or
government department to bring together the vast and various elements of academia,
business, and government efforts already underway so that they may share best
practices and efforts amongst each other.

5

National Intelligence Council. (2021). Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections. Intelligence Community Assessment. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-dec
lass-16MAR21.pdf.
6 Wood, D; McMinn, S; Feng,E. (2019). China Used Twitter to Disrupt Hong Kong Protests, but
Efforts Began Years Earlier. National Public Radio. https://www.npr.org/2019/09/17/758146019/
china-used-twitter-to-disrupt-hong-kong-protests-but-efforts-began-years-earlier.
7 Uyghur Human Rights Project. (2020). The Happiest Muslims in the World: Disinformation,
Propaganda, and the Uyghur Crisis. Uyghur Human Rights Project. https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/Dis
information_Propganda_and_the_Uyghur_Crisis.pdf.
8 Bernard, R; Bowsher, G; Sullivan, R; Gibson-Fall, F. (2021). Disinformation and Epidemics:
Anticipating the Next Phase of Biowarfare. Health Security. Volume 19, Number 1. https://www.lie
bertpub.com/doi/pdf/10.1089/hs.2020.0038.
9 Giles, C; Bhat, U. (2020). Nagoro-Karabakh: The Armenian-Azeri ‘Information Wars’. BBC
Reality Checks and Anti-disinformation Unit. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54614392.
10 Beech, H. (2021). ‘Now We Are United’: Myanmar’s Ethnic Divisions Soften after
Coup. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/30/world/asia/myanmar-ethnic-min
ority-coup.html.
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Introduction
A once-in-a-century global pandemic swept across the world, shuttering economies
[16],11 killing millions, and infecting millions more [17]12 with long-term health
complications that are, as of yet, not fully understood [18].13 Entire countries have
shut down normal day-to-day habits to quell the spread of a novel coronavirus with
well-documented origins from China. Mass transit, eating in a restaurant, watching
movies in a theatre, and most typical extended family get-togethers came to a halt
to stop the spread of a dangerous respiratory virus [19].14 Phrases such as “social
distancing,” “mask-up,” and “stop the spread” became a part of common vernacular.
As most nations scrambled to keep their citizens safe and control the situation to the
best of their ability, China and Russia saw the chaos unfolding as an opportunity to
spread disinformation surrounding COVID19.
Russia began its disinformation campaigns to sow disarray among democratic
nations both near and far. Initially fueled by underplaying the threat of COVID19
[20],15 they quickly began going after COVID19 restrictions and masking requirements, exacerbating a burgeoning anti-lockdown movement [21]16 across the United
States and parts of Europe [22].17 Their goal: have Americans and Europeans question their governments’ attempts to protect the population as some form of removal
of human rights. As the monumental push to create, test, and distribute a vaccine to
protect the population from the virus came with unparalleled cooperation between

11

McKinsey and Company. (2021). Covid-19: Implications for Business. McKinsey and
Company. Executive Briefing. https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/risk-and-resilience/
our-insights/covid-19-implications-for-business#.
12 Center for System Sciences and Engineering (CSSE). (2021). COVID-19 Dashboard. Johns
Hopkins University. ARCGIS. https://www.arcgis.com/apps/dashboards/bda7594740fd402994234
67b48e9ecf6.
13 Blomberg, B; Mohn, K; Brokstad, KA et al. (2021). Long COIVD in a prospective cohort of
home-isolated patients. Nature Medicine. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-021-01433-3.
14 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2020). CDC Calls on Americans to wear mask
to prevent COIVD-19 Spread. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. https://www.cdc.gov/
media/releases/2020/p0714-americans-to-wear-masks.html.
15 Loucaides, D; Perrone, A. (2021). Germany’s COVID sceptics fueled by Russian media and
far-Right Conspiracies. openDemocracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/germanys-covid-sce
ptics-fuelled-by-russian-media-and-far-right-conspiracies/.
16 Benson, T. (2020). Trolls and bots are flooding social media with disinformation encouraging
states to end quarantine. Business Insider. Tech. https://www.businessinsider.com/trolls-bots-flo
oding-social-media-with-anti-quarantine-disinformation-2020-4.
17 Emmot, R. (2020). Russia deploying coronavirus disinformation to sow panic in West, EU
document says. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-disinformation/rus
sia-deploying-coronavirus-disinformation-to-sow-panic-in-west-eu-document-says-idUSKBN21
518F.
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government, academia, and industry in a record time, Russia moved to prop up longstanding anti-vaccination conspiracy theories to slow the adoption of the COVID19
vaccine [23].18
China, by contrast, looked less to pull the rest of the world down but rather to
elevate its own standing. Downtrodden by the news reports about Chinese failures
to initially contain the virus as the source of the pandemic, China began a disinformation campaign in February 2020 with multiple, spontaneous origins to lessen
their fault [24].19 China bolstered the campaign through additional influence operations, sending medical supplies and doctors to Europe [25]20 and later vaccines to
South America [26].21 As the number of U.S. and E.U. cases and deaths increased,
China used its social media sphere to antagonize the perceived failures of democracy to handle the virus in comparison to their “superior system of government”
[24]22 When these attempts failed, China decided to claim instead that COVID19
was actually a bioweapon from the United States, part of a conspiracy to destroy
China [27].23
While the two competing powers had different goals, their use of social media and
disinformation stood closely aligned. Inauthentic accounts, astroturfing, information
laundering, and algorithmic manipulation were mainstays used to push messages
further and faster. A new era of propaganda and disinformation is coming of age,
ready to divide citizens and discredit democracy. Without properly understanding
the problem and how it will be used more readily by nation-states in addition to the
traditional powers, it will be near impossible to stop.

18

Miller, H. (2021). Russia’s Anti-Vaccine Propaganda is Tatamount to a Declaration of War. Center
for Medical Economic and Innovation. https://medecon.org/russias-anti-vaccine-propaganda-is-tan
tamount-to-a-declaration-of-war/.
19 Chen, E. (2021). Chinese COVID-19 Misinformation A Year Later. The Jamestown Foundation
Global Research and Analysis. https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-covid-19-misinformationa-year-later/.
20 Reuters Staff. (2020). China sends medical supplies, experts to help Italy battle coronavirus.
Reuters Healthcare and Pharma. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-italyrespirators/china-sends-medical-supplies-experts-to-help-italy-battle-coronavirus-idUSKBN21
01IM.
21 Mallapaty, S. (2021). China’s COVID vaccines are going global—but questions remain. Nature
Magazine https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01146-0.
22 Chen, E. (2021). Chinese COVID-19 Misinformation A Year Later. The Jamestown Foundation
Global Research and Analysis. https://jamestown.org/program/chinese-covid-19-misinformationa-year-later/.
23 Kinetz, E. (2021). Anatomy of a conspiracy: With COVID, China took leading role. Associated
Press. https://apnews.com/article/pandemics-beijing-only-on-ap-epidemics-media-122b73e134b7
80919cc1808f3f6f16e8.
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Background
Propaganda and disinformation are not new methods for changing the behavior of a
population, nor are they relegated to nonmilitary roles and impacts. In “Munitions
of the Mind,” author Philip Taylor states that the use of military poems and hymns
to build morale and strike fear into adversaries was commonplace within ancient
Babylonia by 1300 BCE [28].24 The Assyrians, espec ially, used these methods
heavily during their campaigns against the nation-states of the Kassites, Ur, and
Urak to build their armies’ confidence while making their enemies fear their great
feats on the battlefield [28].25 A natural progression of the adage, “history is written
by the victors,” continued until the invention of the Gutenberg printing press sparked
a revolution in the ability to spread information.
Although printing methods preceded Gutenberg’s landmark invention, 1445 CE
stands as a crossroads of propaganda [29].26 No longer were nations or the church
responsible for the spread of information and knowledge; individuals with access to
printing presses could furnish their own views en masse to the greater population.
Text—and literacy—broke free from the original Latin as scholars, scientists, and
religious figures could now produce works in their native tongues [30].27 It is no
wonder that the Renaissance and Reformation, two monumental social upheavals of
modern history, took place in the wake of the printing press. Control of information
has been a critical part of nations’ stories—the only difference now is the medium
through which they spread.
Pushback against the Catholic church throughout Europe was led, in part, by
propaganda from Protestant believers. The seismic power shift was primarily due to
the change in technologies that opened up access to information and who could shape
information into shared knowledge. The advent of radios and motion pictures led to
their immediate use as media for propaganda. The Nazi Party utilized radio heavily
to consolidate power following 1933 [31].28 Both Axis and Allied powers used
newsreels at the start of motion pictures to spread propaganda during World War II
[32]29 and used Hollywood to spread American influence thereafter. It, therefore, was
the logical outcome that a new mode of communication—the internet, and especially
social media—shepherded in a new age of propaganda and disinformation.

24

Taylor, P. (2003). Munitions of the mind: A history of propaganda. Manchester University Press.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt155jd69.
25 Taylor, P. (2003). Munitions of the mind: A history of propaganda. Manchester University Press.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt155jd69.
26 Edwards, M. (1994). Printing, Propaganda, and Martin Luther. Berkeley: University of California Press. https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft3q2nb278;chunk.id=0;doc.
view=print.
27 https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft3q2nb278;chunk.id=0;doc.view=
print.
28 https://www.ushmm.org/collections/bibliography/nazi-propaganda-1.
29 Jowett, G; O’Donnell, V. (2012). Propaganda and Persuasion, 5th Edition. Sage Publications.
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When applied to the United States and Western liberal democracies as a whole,
propaganda and disinformation can attack the foundational elements and requirements needed for self-governance directly. If a population is led to believe that elections are stolen, that, in turn, leads to a breakdown in participation in the democratic
process. If that process is skewed to one individual group or belief structure, it will
lead to the dissolution of rights or protections of subsets of the citizenry under the
rule of law. This process of breaking down the foundation of democracy is akin to
removing the leg of a table: while the structure may remain mostly intact, it cannot
hold weight, and its contents fall, slipping into disarray and chaos.

Inauthentic Users and Astroturfing
In a May 2021 presentation to the U.S. Agency for Global Media and the Aspen
Institute, Peter Pomerantsev spoke of how, ideally, democracies operate under the
notion of one vote, one voice; but with online disinformation campaigns, adversarial
groups and countries can drown out an individual’s voice with a flood of activity
from inauthentic users [33].30 This process of building a false consensus is commonly
referred to as “astroturfing,” a play on a grassroots initiative in that some outside force
is manufacturing the consensus to make it seem as if it is authentic. An example of
astroturfing that was uncovered was around a movement to discredit feminists through
the Twitter hashtag #endfathersday [34].31 Several inauthentic accounts claiming to
be women, particularly women of color, began posting vitriolic speech towards men
under the hashtag. Members of the platform quickly began calling out inauthentic
users under the hashtag #YourSlipIsShowing.
Inauthentic users are those who use the anonymity of the internet to create fake
personas to push ideas, disinformation, and state propaganda. These false users can
drive the astroturfing initiative to drown out authentic views of a situation, pushing
forth a narrative that is most beneficial to the malign influence campaigns’ goals.
Inauthentic users fall under two broad categories, automated false accounts or “bots,”
and human-run false accounts or “sock puppets” [7].32
Bots are defined as accounts that are created and their actions automated to
resemble those actions of a genuine user. These bots can be quickly created and

30

https://watch.eventive.org/m4df2021/play/6074567c86f143003e0cbd99/6074697b69154f0030
86bb13.
31 Broderick, R. (2014). Activists Are Outing Hundreds Of Twitter Users Believed To Be 4chan
Trolls Posing As Feminist. BuzzFeed News. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanhatesthis/
your-slip-is-showing-4chan-trolls-operation-lollipop.
32 Bradshaw, S; Bailey, H; Howard, P. (2020). 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social
Media Manipulation. Computational Propaganda Research Project. Oxford Internet Institute. Oxford University. https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/127/2021/02/Cyb
erTroop-Report20-Draft9.pdf.
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employed into an information space for both spreading disinformation and manipulating engagement [35],33 and algorithmic confounding [36].34 Due to their reliance
on automation, much of their interactions becomes easier to track due to temporal
aspects, posting at regular intervals, social subgraphs (who they are interacting with),
and similarity of content, as it is easier to repeat content than create new, unique
content for so many additional users [37].35 That said, advances in technology,
which will be addressed later in the chapter, are making these trackable features
more difficult.
Bots then contrast with sock puppets accounts, which are operated by real people
under a fake persona. This allows the accounts to have a more authentic and personalized feel. Although tracking by metadata and I.P. addresses are still possible, the
variety of the content produced, and ability to converse with anyone interacting with
the influence campaign more directly, sock puppet accounts can be more difficult to
ascertain.
Although bots, sock puppets, and so-called “troll farms” came into national media
attention and prominence following the 2016 U.S. presidential election and British
European Union Referendum, their use has a long history. The earliest documented
attempts were on Russian Politicheskie web forums in the late 1990s and early 2000s
[38].36 Journalist Anna Polyanskaya described the shift from liberal democratic
themes to strict authoritarian ideals in her expose in Vesnik in 2003. Polyanskaya
observed a notable shift as Russian President Vladimir Putin began to consolidate
his political power, citing various inconsistencies in the overall tone of posts, which
leaned pro-Putin, compared to polling across RuNet, which leaned liberal and was
constrained by single votes per I.P. address [38].37
Later in the 2000s, a Russian arm of the hacker collective known as Anonymous
released emails tied to the pro-Kremlin youth organization, Nashi [39].38 These
emails described web “brigades” of paid internet users who flooded various elements
of the internet to counter claims and harass dissidents. These users were paid upwards
of $3 per post depending on the amount of feedback [39].39 By the 2010s, Russia
33

Ferrara E. (2020) Bots, Elections, and Social Media: A Brief Overview. In: Shu K., Wang S., Lee
D., Liu H. (eds) Disinformation, Misinformation, and Fake News in Social Media. Lecture Notes
in Social Networks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42699-6_6.
34 Bakir, V. and McStay, A. (2018). Fake News and the Economy of Emotions. Digital Journalism, 6:2, 154-175, https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1345645.
35 Anderson, J; Rainie, L; Vogels, e > (2021). Expers Say the ‘New Normal’ in 2025 Will Be Far
More Tech-Driven, Presenting More Big Challenges. Pew Research Center. Emerging Technologies.
Future of the Internet. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2021/02/18/experts-say-the-new-nor
mal-in-2025-will-be-far-more-tech-driven-presenting-more-big-challenges/.
36 Polysanskaya, A; Krivov, A; Lomko, I. (2003). The Virtual Eye of Big Brother. Vestnik Online.
http://www.vestnik.com/issues/2003/0430/win/polyanskaya_krivov_lomko.htm.
37 Polysanskaya, A; Krivov, A; Lomko, I. (2003). The Virtual Eye of Big Brother. Vestnik Online.
http://www.vestnik.com/issues/2003/0430/win/polyanskaya_krivov_lomko.htm.
38 Elder, M. (2012). Polishing Putin: hacked emails suggest dirty tricks by Russian youth group. The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/07/putin-hacked-emails-russian-nashi.
39 Elder, M. (2012). Polishing Putin: hacked emails suggest dirty tricks by Russian youth group. The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/07/putin-hacked-emails-russian-nashi.
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moved beyond its internal manipulation and began heavily utilizing online brigades
against both regional neighbors and internationally against the U.S. and West as a
whole. By 2014, Russia was fomenting large-scale operations in support of hybrid
warfare through the support of far-right and ethnocentric movements in the U.S. and
Europe.
Although Russia was the first suspected peddler in online manipulation, they were
not the only country entering into this burgeoning field. China began utilizing online
manipulation through paid internet commentators as early as October 2004, when
the CCP Propaganda Department of Changsha began hiring users to manipulate
local online forums [40].40 Quickly, the national CCP Ministry of Education began
censoring and astroturfing, or creating fake grassroots movements, across Chinese
university bulletin board systems and forums [41].41
Networks of inauthentic users working together utilize various tools available
to them to spread disinformation and propaganda to susceptible users in order to
muddy the waters [42],42 gain an information advantage [43],43 or enact a real world
response [44].44 Typically, they coordinate their functions to use social media platforms recommendation algorithms to their advantage [45],45 to move fringe ideas
and disinformation from their inauthentic network to more authentic ones to add
legitimacy to the disinformation campaign [46],46 thus, creating more misinformation as it spreads. These networks can do this with nightmarish precision due to the
vast mountains of information available for sale [47],47 stolen from email servers or
40

Bandurski, D. (2008). China’s Guerrilla War for the Web. China Media Project. China Internet
Research Conference. https://chinamediaproject.org/2008/07/07/feer-chinas-guerrilla-war-for-theweb/.
41 King, G; Pan, J; Roberts, M. (2017) > How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media
Post for Strategic Distraction, not Engaged Argument. American Political Science Review, vol. 111,
pg. 484–501. https://gking.harvard.edu/files/gking/files/50c.pdf.
42 Lock, I; Ludolph, R. (2019). Organizational propaganda on the Internet: A systematic review.
Public Relations Inquiry. vol 9, issue 1, pg 103–127. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/
2046147X19870844.
43 Kenny, C; Bergman, M. (2019). Understanding and Combating Russian and Chinese Influence
Operations. Center for American Progress, Foreign Policy and Security. https://www.americanp
rogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/02/28/466669/understanding-combating-russian-chineseinfluence-operations/.
44 Select Committee on Intelligence. United States Senate. (2018). Russian Active Measures
Campaigns and Interference in the 20,216 U.S. Election Volume 2: Russia’s Use of Social Media
with Additional Views. 116th Congress. Senate. 1st Session. Report 116-XX. https://www.intellige
nce.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume2.pdf.
45 Meserole, C. (2018). How misinformation spreads on social media—and what to do about
it. Brookings Institute. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/05/09/how-misinf
ormation-spreads-on-social-media-and-what-to-do-about-it/.
46 Arjomand, N. (2019). Information Laundering and Globalized Media—Part I: The Problem.
Center for International Media Assistance. https://www.cima.ned.org/blog/information-launde
ring-and-globalized-media-part-i-the-problem/.
47 Sherman, J. (2021). Federal Privacy Rules Must Get “Data Broker” Definitions Right. Lawfare.
Consumer Data. https://www.lawfareblog.com/federal-privacy-rules-must-get-data-broker-defini
tions-right.
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scraped from publicly available sources [48]48 from the very same platforms they are
manipulating. By building this false notion of consensus through astroturfing, real
voices are drowned out, directly hindering the ability of citizens to play a part in active
participation within civil society [49].49 Without the ability to have a shared foundation between citizens, the ability to engage in the collective action of self-governance
faces a significant threat of being destroyed.

Algorithmic Confounding
Search engines [50],50 e-commerce platforms [51],51 and social media networks
[52]52 all utilize machine learning algorithms to recommend items to their users.
These items range from a new book or movie to the news they read. These algorithms are split into three main types: content filtering, collaborative learning, and
knowledge-based systems [53].53 Each algorithm works slightly differently and can
be used individually or in tandem with the other base algorithms to tailor the end
user’s experience. Content filtering, simply put, is using the choices of a single user
and finding similarly categorized items to recommend, like offering a keyboard with
a purchase of a computer mouse. Collaborative learning, also called collaborative
filtering, takes the preference of one user and compares it to other similar users. The
users with a large overlap in preference may be driven to other items frequented by
like-minded users. For example, if one user enjoys a particular rock band’s music, they
may be recommended a different band’s music because another user also enjoys the
first band and regularly listens to the recommended band as well. Finally, knowledgebased systems require rules written by subject matter experts with vast amounts of
specific domain knowledge in the product being recommended. Usually, knowledgebased systems are hybrid algorithms that work with content modeling, collaborative
learning, or both.
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These recommendations alone have a profound effect on marketing and the end
user’s decision-making process. Researchers from Princeton University’s departments of computer science and sociology showed that recommendation engines
increased homogeneity through the selection bias and reinforced feedback from
retraining the algorithm, commonly referred to as live systems, on those initial
choices, making them more skewed in their distribution of items recommended
[54].54 When applied to controversial or political topics, it begins to skew the populace from a shared basis of understanding. This can be leveraged to make greater
divides between sets of people despite not being as far apart as they might seem.
Without a shared perspective and culture, consensus building becomes much more
difficult, if not impossible. Without consensus, a representative democracy will begin
to burst at the seams.
In Brazil, recommendations from YouTube helped to radicalize numerous individuals after updates to its recommendation engine. New York Times’ reporters Max
Fisher and Amanda Taub traced how Brazilian far-right politicians and conspiracy
theorists came to prominence by embracing the video platform, elevating their exposure through the use of music and video games while exposing political beliefs.
This allowed once-fringe lawmakers like Jair Bolsonaro to become president [55]55
and others to win in dramatic landslides. YouTube’s algorithm drives upward of 70
percent of viewership, keeping users watching, and driving billions of dollars in ad
revenue to parent company Alphabet [56]56 YouTube also acts as a producer of the
content, since their ad revenue sharing pays the influencers to create and publish
content. As such, it adds liquidity to some of these operations, funding those who
otherwise might not be able to push the disinformation.
Engagement on most of the major platforms is driven by some form of user voting
system. Users can like, upvote, share, and retweet content to make it more visible
in the recommendation system. This can and is easily manipulated to twist public
opinion on controversial issues. In 2014, the terrorist group known as the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS as it is more commonly referred, began taking over
popular hashtags, a grouping mechanism for similar topics, to espouse their violent
ideology and recruit new members [57].57 Similarly, on Reddit, a group of users and
moderators manipulated Reddit’s use of stickied posts, or posts that are the first seen
on a smaller “subreddit,” to create an inorganic flow of engagement. This caused
posts on r/The_Donald, a subreddit for then U.S. presidential candidate Donald
Trump, to surge to the top of r/all, the most popular posts throughout the platform
54
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starting in March 2016. This continued throughout the summer and the election until
November 24 of that year when the CEO of Reddit, Steve Huffman, intervened [58]58
and stopped the manipulation.
Coupling the user manipulation of engagement with the algorithmic confounding
present in most recommendation engines allows for disinformation peddlers to move
their message from the white noise of social media to virality. While fringe materials
may not be naturally seen by the majority of the populace, abusing these systems
can vastly increase the number of people who view false and misleading materials.
A study by Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Media Lab, authors Soroush
Vosoughi, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral found that false news stories spread further and
faster than true stories [59]59 ; reaching upwards of 100,000 users at the top 1% of
stories, where traditional news at the same level rarely peaked 1,000 users. False
stories also spread at a rate 6 times that of their truthful counterparts.

Information Laundering
One of the biggest hurdles our adversaries face is making their disinformation reaches
a critical mass. While astroturfing and algorithmic confounding can be used to get
more individuals to see the content, information laundering will spread the message
more quickly due to the added legitimacy [60].60 Information laundering is the act
of a legitimate source, whether a political commentator, social media influencer, or
politicians themselves, taking disinformation and spreading it across their network.
By attaching their name or brand to a set of disinformation, this acts to legitimize it
even if the user in question never directly states they believe in it. This methodology
was shown in the 2021 report from the Center for Countering Digital Hate called
the Disinformation Dozen, where 12 individuals were responsible for up to 63% of
anti-vaccination content on social media [61].61
The use of intermediaries in many cases invokes a parasocial relationship between
the trusted influencer, and the target audience [62].62 The audience trusts the influencer’s opinion as they would any other real world interpersonal relationship, causing
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strangers to have a much stronger hold on citizen’s lives than there would be in traditional outreach and marketing. With the increase of social media usage over time
particularly through the 2020 global SARS COVID-19 pandemic [63],63 more and
more people relied on social media to get their much-needed interpersonal relationships. This reliance led to a huge growth in disinformation spread and acceptance of
conspiracy theories, particularly surrounding anti-government and anti-democracy
movements [64].64
Information laundering acts as a pipeline, moving disinformation from an
untrusted source to a trusted one for greater dissemination and belief. Bret Schafer
and Kirill Meleshevich of the Alliance for Securing Democracy describe information
laundering as a three-step process [60].65 The first step is placement. This is done
through the inauthentic accounts, whether bots or sockpuppets, putting the initial
disinformation into the information environment. Typically, bots will be used for
acting in tandem to spread the disinformation through networks, while simultaneously using some form of algorithmic confounding to elevate it to multiple users.
By using multiple accounts in tandem, the disinformation is made legitimate since
it becomes more difficult to attribute it to a single source, and therefore debunk.
The next step is layering. In order to gain authenticity, and the potential removal of
content, the disinformation must travel through various layers, usually some form of
intermediary to spread. In many cases the intermediaries and unwitting participants
who spread misinformation because it fits a social narrative that they agree with.
While algorithmic confounding can help with this, it is usually not the only pathway.
For example, during the lead up in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, Russian
hackers broke into the Democratic National Convention’s chairman Jon Podesta’s
personal and professional emails, and passed selected information to Wikileaks, a
seemingly neutral third party [65].66 Wikileaks’ founder, Julian Assange, was heavily
tied to Russian intelligence agencies and often acted as a disinformation conduit for
them, going as far to obscure the true source of the leaked emails, insinuating it was a
former DNC staffer, Seth Rich, who was tragically murdered in July of 2016 [66].67
The final step of information laundering is integration. This step requires legitimate news outlets to share the disinformation to a greater scale. In 2020 alone,
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multiple cases of this integration have occurred. Leading up to the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, Russian groups tried to plant incriminating documents about then
Democratic Nominee Joseph Biden in the preceding months. While many news organizations refused to publish the article due to the inability to corroborate the claims,
a few mainstream outlets did, adding legitimacy to the influence campaign.
This legitimization of disinformation can be as simple as reaching a social media
influencer who shares it with their followers, elevating its visibility to potentially
millions of users. Or it can be nuanced trafficking through multiple legitimate and
illegitimate social media platforms, websites, blogs, and algorithms to end up at its
target. For example, throughout 2019 and 2020, Russia ran a website called “Peace
Data” to influence left leaning citizens in the English-speaking world with the use of
known freelance reporters were to add legitimacy to the site [67].68 These freelance
reporters approached on Twitter and asked to write articles on various topics and
were paid between $100 and $250 per article. Many of these articles, according to
the freelancers, were then spun by the editorial staff to have a particular political
angle.

Privacy
While most of the previous techniques may seem like these groups are releasing
disinformation on the grand ocean of social media and hoping for something to
stick, this couldn’t be further from reality. Data brokerage was a $200 billion dollar
industry in 2020 and has no signs of slowing down in growth [68].69 Nearly all
social media companies rely on data and advertising, and the sale of both, in order to
remain profitable. The adage, “If you’re not paying for it, you’re not the customer;
you’re the product” [69]70 has become a staple for the current internet age. As such, a
cottage industry has sprouted up around the buying and selling of data, the building of
user profiles, demographics of user history, purchases, and website viewings, while
predicting their potential actions [70].71 Hundreds of entities and companies exist
solely to buy and sell data for advertising, with many of which are hiding or refusing
to show what data they own on U.S. citizens [71].72
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Social media platforms themselves act more as first part data miners, as they
have huge troves of data produced by their users daily. Their proprietary recommendation algorithms claim that they can target specific groups at highly accurate
rates [72, 73].73 ,74 For example, Facebook allows advertisers to push their content
to specific demographics, in specified locations, with selected interests and behaviors, some of which would be illegal in other contexts [74].75 Facebook has had
multiple instances where they allowed people to exclude Black Americans and other
minorities from housing advertisements, a violation of the Fair Housing Act [75].76
Facebook has refused requests to show what advertisements were targeted toward
service members, either for fraudulent companies like multi-level marketing schemes
or political advertisements. As a result, companies can specifically target U.S. service
members or veterans directly, using this highly trusted group to launder misinformation into the mainstream. There is no oversight or regulation of this targeted
advertising industry. Individuals and companies are allowed to spend whatever they
want with their targeting limited only by the metrics a company. For example, Russia
purchased hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of ads from Facebook leading up
to the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election in order to influence its results [76].77
Due to limited laws governing data privacy, the onus is placed on the user to
protect themselves. This is onerous because, as previously stated, the data being
collected can be completely unknown to the end user. In many cases, organizations
that do completely other tasks, may be collecting data on a user to sell. In 2020,
Avast, a large antivirus company with upwards of 430 million active monthly users,
was collecting web browser history across accounts and sessions and selling them on
the market [77].78 Sessions replays act as recreation of a user’s action on a Document
Object Model, essentially the framework that makes a website or web application,
allowing the data collected to be more that strictly clickthrough rates, but to include
hovering over certain sections, how they navigate the page itself, and what they seem
to focus on [78].79
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Furthermore, even when users turn off their locational data within a specified
app, they are still being tracked through their phone through their Mobile Advertising ID [79].80 These MAIDs, as they are commonly referred to, allow cellular
phone manufacturers to tailor aids to you while not linking personally identifiable
information to the person who owns and uses the phone. However, like many other
issues with privacy, in practice MAIDs are not anonymous, and there is an industry
specifically for unmasking MAIDs and connecting them to real people [80].81 Being
able to track individuals by their device opens several possibilities for near peers to
build a pattern of life, directly influence them, or depending on their web content,
compromise them.
One of the most notorious cases of this kind of targeted influence is Cambridge
Analytica and their scandals involving the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections and the
British EU Referendum. Cambridge Analytica claimed to be able to microtarget
users to greater political engagement and voter turnout. The Company, which was
a subsidiary of a private intelligence company, used data collected for academic
research to microtarget U.S. and U.K. citizens for specific political movements at
scale [81].82 They also incorporated psychographic information, alleging in their
marketing materials that they could psychologically target individuals. Whistleblower Christopher Wylie also claimed ties between Cambridge Analytica and
Russian government intermediaries in a Senate Judiciary hearing [82].83 While many
users understood that their data might be advertised in products, they may not have
been aware that they could potentially be used by foreign countries to cause political
turmoil.
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Deplatforming and Forced Migration
Following the fallout around Cambridge Analytica and foreign influence campaigns
interference in U.S. Politics, a number of social media companies began working
through the problem [83–85].84 ,85 ,86 Many used the tactic of removing the content
from suspected foreign accounts, or groups infiltrated by foreign entities, which were
typically bot or sock puppets. While each platform had their own methodology for
identifying accounts or groups, they generally kept that methodology secret to the
public. Certain platforms, like Twitter [83],87 were open about what they removed
and archived it for use by other academics and researchers, other platforms kept it
a secret and closed ranks. This occurred while simultaneously removing real users
who violated that platforms terms of service, typically around inciting violence and
hate speech [86, 87],88 ,89 or general public safety following the COIVD19 Global
Pandemic [88].90 This removal of real people, commonly referred to as deplatforming, had some short-term success in reducing disinformation and misinformation
on the platform [89].91
Studies done by the iDrama Lab, led by Jeremy Blackburn of Binghamton University, on two deplatformed subreddits showed that user participation on the platform
will decrease after a deplatforming event, reduce the amount of new users, and reduce
the amount of overall content [90].92 A similar study by researchers out of Georgia
Institute of Technology on two separate subreddits confirmed the iDrama research,
as well as showed that rates of hate speech declined by the users who remained
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on the platform [91].93 For the platforms themselves, this serves as a positive as it
removes some of the malevolent forces within them, and shows they have an active
moderation and environment free from issues that might lose advertising.
While deplatforming has some benefits, it also has some detriments. One of the
biggest is that it can have the tendency to draw attention to a group or movement
that hasn’t gained mainstream attention [92].94 While Reddit banned the Qanon
Conspiracy for violent rhetoric in 2018, it grew continuously through 2020, reaching
its height following the U.S. Presidential Election [93],95 potentially due in part
through the media coverage undermining that deplatforming effort. Adding the taboo
of removal from a major social media can push a conspiracy, particularly one centered
around persecution, to critical mass [94].96 While deplatforming will remove potential problems from a specific platform, and potentially make things better within it,
it will not remove the ideas and narrative behind the problem.
If users are removed from a platform, or that platform itself is deplatformed from
a host, the users within a group will typically attempt to migrate to another more open
platform [95].97 This migration will have multiple results. The first are beneficial, in
that typically there isn’t a 1 to 1 movement, generally losing active members along
the way. The group will also likely not have as large of an audience to recruit from as
they would on a large, corporate social media platform [90].98 Typically, the benefits
end there, and instead become benefits for foreign influence campaigns. Users that
migrate typically become more insular and radicalized [90].99 Depending on the political leaning of the group, and the limited moderation, this can be a dangerous combination for political violence. Parler, following mass exodus of conservative users from
Twitter, grew substantially through 2020. However, following the Capitol Insurrection on January 6th, 2021, Parler lost its hosting through Amazon Web Services.

93

Chandrasekharan, E et all. (2017). You Can’t Stay Here: The Efficacy of Raddit’s 2015 Ban
Examined Through Hate Speech. Proceedings of the ACM on Human–Computer Interaction, Vol1,
article 31. Pages 1–22 https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3134666.
94 Aliapoulious, M et al. (2021). An Early Look at the Parler Online Social Network. Proceedings
of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media, 15 pages 943–951. https://arxiv.
org/pdf/2101.03820.pdf.
95 Dickson, EJ. (2021). The Qanon Community Is in Crisis—But On Telegram, It’s Also Growing.
Rolling Stone Magazine. https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/qanon-telegram-cha
nnels-increase-1117869/.
96 Nickas, J; Isaac, M; Frenkel, S. (2021). Millions Flock to Telegram and Signal as Fear Grows
Over Big Tech. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/technology/telegramsignal-apps-big-tech.html.
97 Johnson NF et all. (2019). Hidden resilience and adaptive dynamics of the global online hate
ecology. Nature 573, pages 261–265. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1494-7.
98 Ribeiro, MH et all. (2021). Do Platform Migrations Compromise Content Moderations? Evidence
from r/The Donald and r/Incels. 24th ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work
and Social Computing https://arxiv.org/pdf/2010.10397.pdf.
99 Ribeiro, MH et all. (2021). Do Platform Migrations Compromise Content Moderations? Evidence
from r/The Donald and r/Incels. 24th ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work
and Social Computing https://arxiv.org/pdf/2010.10397.pdf.

The Future of Cyber-Enabled Influence Operations …

215

This led Parler to turn to DDoS-Guard for these services, a company with ties to the
Russian Federation, who’s owners are based in Rostov-on-Don, Russia [96].100
These smaller offshoots, also have more questionable security practices compared
to their larger corporate counterparts. Activists attempted to catalog Parler posts
following the Capitol Insurrection and found a vulnerability that allowed them to
pull all data from the platform at an admin level, including deleted posts, messages,
and locational data [97].101 Similarly, Gab, a platform who hosted the 2018 Tree of
Life synagogue shooter [98],102 was hacked the next month, leaking private messages
and content similar to that of the Parler leak [99].103 Both of these platforms include
U.S. congress members and U.S. Senators, along with a slew of state legislators,
mayors, and governors. Another study done by the iDrama lab, in cooperation with
Boston University’s SecLAB, showed that many users deplatformed go to these
alternative platforms only to become more vitriolic, although losing much of the size
of their following in doing so [100].104

Generative Media
New machine learning algorithms that produce realistic images, videos, audio, and
text are being created every day. These algorithms are generally grouped under
the name of Generative Adversarial Networks [101],105 for the way that two algorithms work against each other, like a counterfeiter against law enforcement, to
generate realistic media. The most notable example is the titular deepfakes, named
as a portmanteau of deep neural networks that create fake media. These videos, as
they were found, typically replaced women in adult films with the faces of celebrities
[102].106 Over the course of 2019 and 2020, these algorithms raised great concern
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among the legal circles [103],107 government officials [104],108 defense analysts
[105],109 academia [106],110 and industry [107]111 for the potential for their use in
disinformation campaigns.
Many of these algorithms are being open sourced and shared on programming
repositories like github and bitbucket [108, 109],112 ,113 open for use by the general
public, and foreign adversaries. In fact, many have already been found in the wild.
Foreign Intelligence Services have already used deep fakes to add credibility to
sock puppet accounts meant for collecting information of U.S. service members
and those of the intelligence community on LinkedIn [110].114 Domestically, U.S.
political groups have used sock puppet accounts to weave a narrative leading up to
elections on Facebook [111].115 These technologies have been so democratized that
a Pennsylvanian mother sent deepfaked pictures of her daughter’s cheerleading rival
[112].116
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These algorithms have a deep amount of potential for abuse by Russia, China, and
Iran in disinformation campaigns. As stated above, they are already being used in
profile pictures on bot and sock puppet account profiles to add a layer of believability.
nVidia Corporation’s StyleGAN [113, 114]117 ,118 , and StyleGAN2 [115, 116]119 ,120
all create detailed and realistic still images that are completely synthetic using a
technique called style transfer, which takes characteristics from one image and applies
them to another. Both trained models have been released to the public, and both have
been used in created accounts.
The reach of GANs and Deepfakes goes much further than that. An algorithm
created by Samsung Moscow can create realistic moving images and videos based
off a single image of a person [117].121 With more images, from different angles,
the quality will increase substantially, making seamless videos over the top of a
staged video. This is a substantial decrease from something like the ‘face swap’
app that gave way to the initial rounds of deepfakes, which required hundreds if
not thousands of images of the target to create a realistic fake. While many news
agencies argue the main threat is political, in practice most targets thus far have been
people without the means to pushback against [118].122 This means the targeting of
government officials, particularly those vulnerable in overseas assignments [119],123
for blackmail and extortion [120],124 which are already commonplace in a foreign
intelligence agency’s arsenal [121].125
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Couple the visualization with synthetic audio [122],126 and you have very realistic
fakes [123]127 that can be made cheaply, quickly, and distributed through the aforementioned information laundering methodology. Foreign adversaries could cause
protests similar to the 2014 Benghazi consulate attack based on fake video or audio.
This could be equally worrisome for both domestic and foreign operations, where
soft targets could be overwhelmed by unknowing populations upset at fake media.
Russia has already expertly orchestrated real world protests using Facebook groups
and advertising [124],128 adding in perfectly crafted fake media could bring that
capability to scale.
And while not Generative Adversarial Networks or deepfakes per se, generative
text [125]129 stands to expand and automate many processes already in use. OpenAI’s
Generative Pretrained Transformers (GPT) [126]130 alone has multiple applications
already in the wild. Users can create realistic social media bots that pull topics from
currently tending topics and create appropriate comments within them. This allows
for robust botnets and sock puppet accounts that will circumvent some of the trusted
methods for hunting and removing their accounts. Other media can be created from
these models as well. Meme generators based of a string of text can create visual
media [127]131 that can be more pervasive and influential than simple text [128].132
Even mainstream news agencies are utilizing model generated text to fill out, or in
other cases entirely write articles on a specific subject with minimal inputs [129].133
Given Russians preponderance to create entire news sites and paying real journalists
for legitimacy, they could potentially automate much of the process for a similar
effect.
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Data Poisoning and Contamination
As automation of disinformation takes hold, processes to find and remove it will
also turn to automation to counter it. As such, much like cyber security, an arms
race will begin between those nations who look to use online spaces for the spread of
disinformation, and those who look to remove it. In order to counter the sheer volume
of disinformation being created, and forensically determine authenticity of various
pieces of media, algorithmic methods will need to be used, as human analysts alone
will not be able to process the volume, variety, and veracity of the data. This, in turn,
will lead to innovative ways to get around these algorithmic filters.
The most likely course of action is to develop adversarial machine learning to
disrupt and outright disable the algorithms trying to identify various methods, media,
and pathways of disinformation. Typically, this is referred to as data poisoning
[130]134 or, if the model is already created and running, data contamination [131].135
Data poisoning serves as an adversarial machine learning attack that focuses on
adding data that the algorithm learns from at the time of model creation. It attempts
to bias the decisions made by the algorithmic model so that selected data goes through
undetected. For a clearer example, if Russia wanted to have more believable accounts,
they could use deepfake images from a GAN to make profile pictures. If the platform, or another nation wanted to find these accounts, they may train a computer
vision algorithm to look for them [132].136 Given the game of cat and mouse, the
Russian creating the media may have anticipated some form of intervention, and
instead overlaid their images with a small marker, only visible to the computer, but
not to the human who labels the data. Thus, the algorithm made to identify and
mark these suspicious accounts will most likely be accounts that are identified by
the placed marker, leaving other accounts, that were not meant to be found easily, to
pass through the algorithmic net.
Comparatively speaking, adversarial data contamination works similarly, but
instead of the algorithm being built off of the data, it’s being updated by new data
after having been already trained. Overall, the methodology would remain the same,
but there would be a larger number of accounts that need to be identified in order to
slowly shift the bias in the direction our adversaries would like. This type of attack
is much more likely, as platforms and others have already begun to algorithmically
filter out fake accounts and synthetic media.
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Conclusion
More and more countries are heavily leaning into online disinformation to further
their political goals both domestically and abroad. Many of which have put information at the forefront of their military and diplomatic campaigns to gain the advantage
in this ever more connected world. Data is readily available for potentially building
psychological profiles of groups at scale, or individually for more precise influencing.
This leads to many different dangers from government and military service members
to the very democratic institutions they uphold. Facts can be drowned out from the
conversation to allow fringe beliefs to seem as though they are commonplace.
Russia and China have decades of online manipulation in their repertoire already
being turned onto the United States, and the greater ideals of western democracies. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, authors of “The Narrow Corridor,”
describe the fragile balance between state and society that allow liberal democracy to
avoid falling into the alternatives of lawlessness or authoritarianism [133].137 If the
state becomes too strong, it risks despots removing liberties from the people, if the
society becomes too strong, it falls into a state of anarchy, where the state’s ability
to protect the populace from groups within fails. Long term influence campaigns
can tilt the balance of power either way, allowing for the house of cards, that is our
freedom, to come tumbling down.
To keep democracy from falling to tatters, we must institute better protection of
our privacy, in particular our data, while our national defense pushes back against
outside actors who look to break it down. Without full-fledged, proactive countering
of our near peers, we will be continuously playing catchup, fighting off our back foot
merely trying to keep our heads above water. Without change to our current stature,
we will inevitably see greater fissures in our society, and less trust in our state. Without
the ability of citizens to actively participate in their government, through free and
fair elections, and build consensus across different belief structures and groups of
citizenries, democracy cannot function in a state that is accepted. It will give way to
other, harsher forms of government, that will see these failures as an opportunity to
seize power at the expense of the rights of many of its citizens.
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